China, a country that does not align with the Anglo-American or stakeholder models of corporate governance (CG), but which is a major economic force in the transition economy.It is steadily moving away from centralised planning of its innovation system by the state to an increasingly open system involving technology outsourcing and imports, and foreign investors’ involvement makes it an interesting context to examine the relationship between CG structures, corporate entrepreneurship (CE) and firm performance.The main findings show that longer tenure length and an extra bonus ratio with higher ownership ratio for executives, but a shorter tenure length for independent non?
On the other hand, the results also show that independent agency strategy does play a vital role as a complementary corporate governance system, with strong evidence for stock companies, but weaker evidence for mutuals.
Corporate governance plays two broad important roles of (i) stewardship and accountability role, that is, it is a mechanism designed to monitor managers and enhance performance of the firm; and (ii) entrepreneurship, that is, providing the mechanisms that motivate managers to create and sustain corporate competitiveness, thereby optimizing shareholders’ wealth.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the impact of corporate governance and distribution strategies on firm performance, following the regulatory changes since 1980s, the technological advances, and the customer preferences’ volatility in the UK insurance industry, in order to explore how insurance companies survive in such a changeable environment.
The aim of the first core chapter is to examine the impact of various corporate governance arrangements on the performance of UK life and non-life insurance firms, both listed and non-listed, during the period 2004-2013.
Third, granted patents exhibit a negative association with state ownership and board size, and positive association with managerial ownership.
Fourth, firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q is positively related to one person acting as both CEO and chairman measured by CEO duality, but negatively related to board size and supervisory board size.The study uses the GMM methodology which permits simultaneous control of both endogeneity of independent variables and fixed effects.The data comprise hand-collected panel dataset of firms that are listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange over the 12-year period (2004-2015).The study provides evidence that, board independence enhances firm performance and that, performance impact of board independence is stronger in closely-held than the widely-held firms.Its findings suggest that the positive impact of board independence on firm performance is moderated by ownership structure.Findings also reveal an insignificantly negative association between the board independence and ownership concentration.The study finds a negative and significant association between the executive directors’ ownership, non-executive directors’ ownership, institutional and non-institutional blockholders’ ownership respectively and Tobin’s Q.Consequently, this thesis aims to investigate the effects of CG structures and CE on firm performance among Chinese listed firms.Specifically, its objectives are to examine the relationship between (1) CG and CE; (2) CG and firm performance; (3) CE and firm performance; and (4) whether CG and CE interact to influence firm performance in the Chinese listed firms.It provides evidence that, except for non-executive directors’ ownership none of other forms of ownership improves firm performance.Finally, regarding the investigation of both the agency and resource dependence role of the females and ethnic minorities on the Nigerian corporate boards, finding reveals a significantly positive association between the ethnic minority directors’ representation, female directors’ presence on the board and firm performance.